A Comparative Analysis of the Lvov-Warsaw School and Frege-Russells Tradition :: Lvov-Warsaw School Frege Russell Tradition

A Comparative Analysis of the Lvov-Warsaw School and Frege-Russell's Tradition ABSTRACT: The aim of this paper is a comparative analysis of the Lvov-Warsaw School and Frege-Russell's tradition. The Comparison of these is made on the grounds of the analysis of existence. Choosing "existence" as the object of the analysis is very essential. It is so because understanding of the category of existence is strongly connected with the whole system. Thus, while analyzing the category, one can make a reconstruction of the concept scheme (in both traditions); show their functioning; and compare them to each other. It is easy to notice that in both these systems: a) analyzing is strongly connected with the way of expressing existence in a language, b) the essential problem is to which category existence belongs, c) the main question is whether existence is a predicate. Since the problem of analyzing—especially the problem of applying logic in philosophy—played an essential role both in Frege-Russell's system and Twardowski's school, the author of this paper wants to show how this was understood there (especially application of logic to some philosophical problems). I. Introductory Remarks G. Frege in the introduction of his "Grundlage der Aritmetik" formulates a general principle: "nach der Bedeutung der WÃ ¶rter im Zusammenhang, nicht in iherer Vereinzelung gefragt werden mu" (G. Frege, Grundlage der Arithmetik, Darmstadt 1961, p. XXII, p. 161. H. Sluga, Gottlob Frege, London 1980, p. 94.). This principle is often called a "context principle". It is stated in there that: 1) A term has a meaning when it belongs to a proposition (is one of its elements); 2) Previous analysis of a proposition is a condition for analysis of the term. Such a view presupposes that proposition is something complex and heterogeneous i.e., its elements belong to different semantic categories. The principle given above makes the following distinctions possible: 1) Division of grammatical elements from logical elements, 2) Division of subjective (psychological) elements from objective elements. Quine in his Two Dogmas of Empiricism states that applying this principle makes an important reorien tation in semantics—"the reorientation whereby the primary vehicle of meaning came to be seen no longer in the term but in the statement" (W.V.O. Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in: From a logical point of view, New York 1963, p. 39). From the above it is easy to see that the meaning of a term is connected with its function in the proposition, for as we know the function depends upon it's location in the proposition.